Dissertation project
Why does an autocrat financially repress his closest business allies during an economic crisis? And why does the business elite rarely defect in the face of repression?
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On the one hand, the financial extortion of the wealthy businesspeople may provide a quick windfall for the regime to survive through a prolonged fiscal crisis. Indeed, the financial shakedown of businesses during economic downturns is quite common across different types of autocratic regimes. However, it is also risky: autocrats may damage their reputation in the international markets with coercive acts like expropriations. Violent repression of political insiders may also trigger collective elite dissent against the regime. Endowed with structural and disruptive power, the business elite may defect from the regime by mobilizing protests and funding the opposition. And yet, despite these inherent risks, dictators choose to financially extort or purge their business allies during economic crises. One might expect dictator’s business allies to defect from the regime in the face of financial repression. However, on average, they do not. The available data suggest that business opposition to autocratic regimes is a rare event. Why?
In my dissertation, I argue that autocrats can financially coerce their business allies during sovereign debt crises with little political cost. They do so by relying on less intensive coercive tactics like tax audits. The co-opted business elite also presents a politically expedient target for repression. First, they can be incorporated into the support coalition in exchange for material benefits without institutional power-sharing concessions. That is why they are relatively easy targets for coercion and less likely to defect from the regime during major crises. Second, due to cronyism and corruption, they lack public support, and the dictator can easily mobilize public opinion to justify their repression and frame it as a crackdown on corruption. In other words, co-optation is a poisonous pill for businesses. The politically connected business elite become punching bags for the dictator during major crises without a credible threat of defection. Once co-opted, the cards get stacked against them, despite their structural power.
Peer-reviewed publications
(2024) Out of sight, out of mind: The impact of lockdown measures on sentiment towards refugees Journal of Information Technology & Politics 21(2): 166-75 (with Amir Abdul Reda and Amine Aboussalah).
Abstract:
How did COVID-19 related movement restrictions impact sentiment toward refugees? Existing theories offer conflicting answers. On the one hand, contact theories suggest that movement restrictions might reduce casual interactions with refugees, leading to less negative sentiments. On the other hand, integrated threat theories suggest refugees may be perceived as a security threat and blamed for these movement restrictions in the first place. To gauge the effect of movement restrictions, we investigate the effect of physical isolation on sentiments toward refugees in Turkey by using a novel dataset. We use Google Mobility Reports’ measurements of movement and our measures of sentiments toward refugees using refugee-related tweets from Turkey. Statistical analysis shows that xenophobic sentiment generally decreased during the pandemic. Our study shows that different types of reduced mobility correlate with increased sympathy toward refugees: the more people stay at home, the more positive sentiments toward refugees they exhibit on Twitter. We conclude by proposing two possible causal mechanisms for these findings. The findings suggest that the absence of casual contact with refugees may yield less negative sentiment, and/or that a rally around the flag mechanism yields unprecedented levels of social solidarity in response to the pandemic.
(2024) Mobilizing the masses: Measuring resource mobilization on Twitter Sociological Methods & Research 53(1): 153-92 (with Amir Abdul Reda and Mohamed Abdalla).
Abstract:
How can we measure the resource mobilization (RM) efforts of social movements on Twitter? In this article, we create the first-ever measure of social movements’ RM efforts on a social media platform. To this aim, we create a four-conditional lexicon that can parse through tweets and identify those concerned with RM. We also create a simple RM score that can be plotted in a time series format to track the RM efforts of social movements in real-time. We use our tools with millions of tweets from the United States streamed between November 28, 2018, and February 11, 2019, to demonstrate how our measure can help us estimate the saliency and persistency of social movements’ RM efforts. We find that our measure captures RM by successfully cross-checking the variation of this score against protest events in the United States during the same time frame. Finally, we illustrate the descriptive and qualitative utility of our tools for understanding social movements by running conventional topic modeling algorithms on the tweets that were used to compute the RM score and point at specific avenues for theory building and testing.
(2022) Containing ethnic conflict: Repression, cooptation, and identity politics Comparative Politics 54(4): 765-86 (with Ceren Belge). [replication]
Abstract:
Why do states target some civilians with collective punishment while coopting others with material goods during an ethnic civil war? This article examines how the Turkish government calibrated its repression and cooptation policies towards the Kurdish population during the counterinsurgency of the 1990s. In contrast to the situational conflict dynamics emphasized by the civil war literature, we explain the distribution of cooptation and repression with the state's identity policy: government policies were more punitive in areas that displayed strong Kurdish linguistic/political identity, or high tribal concentration, while they were more cooptative where the government had fostered a Sunni-Muslim Kurdish identity. The study is based on a novel dataset that includes information about displacement, tribal concentration, and violent events from archival sources.
Under review
(2024) Climate disasters exacerbate polarization: Could cross-partisan outreach help? (with Michael Donnelly).
Abstract:
Can cross-partisan post-disaster solidarity help depolarize? The impact of natural hazards on polarization is mixed, as elite responses mediate effects. Using two country- year-level datasets, we show that wildfires and flood exposure, on average, exacerbate polarization. We then test the effectiveness of cross-partisan relief aid by Turkey’s main opposition, using an in-person survey experiment. Turkey, an electoral autoc- racy with intense polarization, government propaganda, and ethnic conflict, presents a hard test case. Our findings reveal that costly public acts may increase political tol- erance toward the opposition, despite government propaganda. However, it backfires in terms of affective polarization, leading to perceptions of hypocrisy not just among pro-government voters, but also among ethnic minority in opposition. These results suggest that conventional depolarization tools may have unintended and divergent consequences.
(2024) Autocrats and their business allies: The informal politics of defection and co-optation
Abstract:
Why do (not) business allies defect from authoritarian regimes? An emerging scholarship shows that connected businesses face high political risk, and the autocrat can shake down his business allies during a major economic crisis. And yet, despite their structural and disruptive power, the business elite rarely switches to opposition. I argue that this unusual loyalty does not always stem from credible power-sharing. The more material quid pro quo the business elite engages with the dictator, the less they can credibly threaten him with defection. I present a bargaining game between the dictator and his business allies and test these ideas using a country-year-level dataset of 76 countries for the time period 1992-2019. The results indicate that higher degrees of patrimonial co-optation and sovereign debt crises lower the risk of business opposition to the regime. These findings have implications for our understanding of elite defection that even informal, non-institutional tools of co-optation can effectively deter defection.
(2024) Taming the paper tiger? Public support for the repression of the business elite.
Abstract:
Why do autocrats financially repress their closest allies during economic downturns? In response to a fiscal crisis, an autocrat may narrow his base, but these purges may backfire and trigger coups and defection. I argue that autocrats take public opinion seriously for decisions of financial repression, and lacking public popularity, their business allies are politically expedient targets. I created visual conjoints with fake LinkedIn profiles of businesspeople and measured people’s support for their repression in Turkey,
varying cues of co-optation, and their firm’s characteristics. The results indicate that people are more likely to condone the extra-taxation of the co-opted business elite, who are perceived as rent seekers responsible for the economic crisis. Then I discuss the findings’ external validity with illustrative cases from different types of autocratic regimes. This article contributes to growing scholarships on autocratic legitimacy, micro-level determinants of purges, and the cost of political-connectedness.
(2024) Tax audit as authoritarian repression during sovereign debt crises
Abstract:
Why do autocrats financially repress some businesses during economic crises? While the financial extortion of businesses may return quick rents during downturns, such coercion in the middle of a crisis may also backfire with defection and reputational costs. Therefore, the regime would strategically calibrate the target and the tool of coercion. I argue that co-opted businesses present a politically expedient target during economic crises. To that aim, autocrats deploy tax audits against these companies as a technical tool of financial repression. I test these ideas using firm-level data from over 32000 companies in 40 electoral autocracies. The findings show that even though tax audits are less likely during sovereign debt crises, that is not true for firms that have secured a public contract. They are more likely and more frequently to be inspected by the tax authorities, especially during debt crises. The results have significant implications for state-business relations under autocratic regimes.
(2024) Divided at home, divided abroad? Affective polarization and political tolerance among migrants (with Selin Kepenek).
Abstract:
How does polarization at home shape social network formation and political tolerance among immigrants? The existing scholarship suggests that networks with co-nationals in the country of destination can potentially provide a ‘haven’ for newcomers and facilitate their search for jobs, accommodation, and social connections. However, the impact of polarization in the home country on these everyday interactions between immigrants is understudied. We conducted two survey experiments in Turkey using a novel visual treatment of fake Facebook profiles, and replicated the designs in Canada. Our results indicate that home country polarization between regime supporters and opponents travels abroad. Under high polarization in the home country, anti-government immigrants are significantly less likely to help and socially engage with government-supporting co-nationals and tolerate political activities in the host country. However, despite high political polarization at home between anti-government groups, this divisiveness disappears abroad, as they are as likely to support, politically tolerate, and socially engage with each other. The findings offer insight into the mechanisms through which polarization at home can diffuse abroad and how contextual factors can mitigate affective polarization.
Working papers
(2024) Sultanist and militarist soft propaganda, and support for security operations (with Michael Donnelly).
Abstract:
How does autocratic soft propaganda impact support for security operations at home and abroad? Autocratic regimes allocate significant resources for TV series and movies to manufacture public support and boost nationalism. Despite the growing scholarship, we still do not know enough to what extent different types of soft propaganda effectively generate support for military operations. To that aim, we conducted a pre-registered in-person experiment with a representative sample of the Turkish population to measure the varying effects of government-funded militarist and neo-Ottomanist TV series on support for cross-border military operations and domestic police operations. The findings suggest that we should take fiction seriously – neo-Ottomanist TV series significantly increase support for scaling up security operations abroad among religious pro-regime voters, while militarist scripts drive similar attitudes with nationalists. Both scripts fuel anti-Israel sentiments among government supporters. The results show that autocrats cater soft propaganda to different ideological groups within their support base and to varying degrees of effectiveness.
(2024) The prosecution of heads of state and democratic backsliding (with Seva Gunitsky).
Abstract:
A new leader-level dataset on the cases of prosecutions of former heads of state or government in democratic regimes since 1990.
(2024) Can businesses safeguard democracy? (with Lucan Way).
Ongoing research
(2024) The sources of democratic resilience in an age of backsliding (SSHRC-funded project run by Lucan Way and Steve Levitsky)
Abstract:
You may find further details on the argument here.
(2023) The determinants of defection in civil wars: Survey experiments with rebel groups in Myanmar (with POSTCOR).
Abstract:
We will conduct list and conjoint experiments through online surveys with active armed group members in Myanmar and the Philippines to better understand rebel retention. We also hope to establish some priors for future experimental research with active rebel group members. To what extent do they strategically misreport? Are they less attentive compared to the general population? Do they differ in terms of their values/attitudes, including trust in institutions, life satisfaction, and attitudes toward democracy?
Selected presentations
(2024) Sultanist and militarist soft propaganda, and support for security operations. VWAR Workshop (with Michael Donnelly).
(2024) Climate disasters exacerbate polarization: Could cross-partisan outreach help? CEU Democracy Institute DRD Annual Workshop: Breaking the Dynamics of Political Polarization; APSA Annual Conference, Montreal (with Michael Donnelly).
(2020-21) Divided at home, divided abroad? APSA Annual Conference, Seattle; ECPR General Conference (with Selin Kepenek).
(2019) Containing ethnic conflict: Repression, co‑optation, and identity politics. ISA Annual Convention, Toronto (with Ceren Belge).
(2014) A typology of welfare regimes in the Middle East and North Africa. ECPR General Conference, Warsaw.
Other research experience
(2022) Preventing civil war recurrence (with POSTCOR Lab).
(2020) Protests, resource curse, and economic diversification (with Jacques Bertrand).